May 30, 2014 Leave a comment
Following a two-month-long hiatus, adcs://hub.dcbase.org:16591 hosts the DC development hub again.
Topics relating to DC++ and the Direct Connect network
September 20, 2013 Leave a comment
Several TLS attacks since 2011 impel a reassessment of the security of ADC’s usage of TLS to form ADCS. While the specific attacks tend not to be trivially replicated in a DC client as opposed to a web browser, remaining conservative with respect to security remains useful, the issues they exploit could cause problems regardless, and ADCS’s best response thus becomes to deprecate SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0. Ideally, one should use TLS 1.2 with AES-GCM. Failing that, ensuring that TLS 1.1 runs and chooses AES-based ciphersuite works adequately.
2. HTTP-over-TLS Attacks
BEAST renders practical Rogaway’s 2002 attack on the security of CBC ciphersuites in SSL/TLS by using an SSL/TLS server’s CBC padding MAC acceptance/rejection as a timing oracle. Asking whether each possible byte in each position results in successful MAC, it decodes an entire message. One can avert BEAST either by avoiding CBC in lieu of RC4 or updating to TLS 1.1 or 1.2, which mitigate the timing oracle and generate new random IVs to undermine BEAST’s sequential attack.
CRIME and BREACH build on a 2002 compression and information leakage of plaintext-based attack. CRIME “requires on average 6 requests to decrypt 1 cookie byte” and, like BEAST, recognizes DEFLATE’s smaller output when it has found a pre-existing copy of the correct plaintext in its dictionary. Unlike BEAST, CRIME and BREACH depend not on TLS version or CBC versus RC4 ciphersuites but merely compression. Disabling HTTP and TLS compression therefore avoids CRIME and BREACH.
One backwards-compatible solution thus far involves avoiding compression due to CRIME/BREACH and avoiding BEAST with RC4-based TLS ciphersuites. However, a new attack against RC4 in TLS by AlFardan, Bernstein, et al exploits double-byte ciphertext biases to reconstruct messages using approximately 229 ciphertexts; as few as 225 achieve a 60+% recovery rate. RC4-based ciphersuites decreasingly inspire confidence as a backwards-compatible yet secure approach to TLS, enough that the IETF circulates an RFC draft prohibiting RC4 ciphersuites.
Thus far treating DC as sufficiently HTTP-like to borrow their threat model, options narrow to TLS 1.1 or TLS 1.2 with an AES-derived ciphersuite. One needs still beware: Lucky 13 weakens even TLS 1.1 and TLS 1.2 AES-CBC ciphers, leaving between it and the RC4 attack no unscathed TLS 1.1 configuration. Instead, AlFardan and Paterson recommend to “switch to using AEAD ciphersuites, such as AES-GCM” and/or “modify TLS’s CBC-mode decryption procedure so as to remove the timing side channel”. They observe that each major TLS library has addressed the latter point, so that AES-CBC might remain somewhat secure; certainly superior to RC4.
3. ADC-over-TLS-specific Concerns
ADCS clients’ and hubs’ vulnerability profiles and relevant threat models regarding each of BEAST, CRIME, BREACH, Lucky 13, and the RC4 break differ from that of a web browser using HTTP. BEAST and AlFardan, Bernstein, et al’s RC4 attack both point to adopting TLS 1.1, a ubiquitously supportable requirement worth satisfying regardless. OpenSSL, NSS, GnuTLS, PolarSSL, CyaSSL, MatrixSSL, BouncyCastle, and Oracle’s standard Java crypto library have all already “addressed” Lucky 13.
there is nothing particularly special about HTTP and TLS in this side-channel. Any time an attacker has the ability to inject their own payload into plaintext that is compressed, the potential for a CRIME-like attack is there. There are many widely used protocols that use the composition of encryption with compression; it is likely that other instances of this vulnerability exist.
ADCS provides an attacker this capability via logging onto a hub and sending CTMs and B, D, and E-type messages. Weaponizing it, however, operates better when these injected payloads can discover cookie-like repeated secrets, which ADC lacks. GPA and PAS operate via a challenge-reponse system. CTM cookies find use at most once. Private IDs would presumably have left a client-hub connection’s compression dictionary by the time an attack might otherwise succeed and don’t appear in client-client connections. While a detailed analysis of the extent of practical feasibility remains wanting, I’m skeptical CRIME and BREACH much threaten ADCS.
4. Mitigation and Prevention in ADCS
Regardless, some of these attacks could be avoided entirely with specification updates incurring no ongoing cost and hindering implenetation on no common platforms. Three distinct categories emerge: BEAST and Lucky 13 attacks CBC in TLS; the RC4 break, well, attacks RC4; and CRIME and BREACH attack compression. Since one shouldn’t use RC4 regardless, that leaves AES-CBC attacks and compression attacks.
Disabling compression might incur substantial bandwidth cost for little thus-far demonstrated security benefit, so although ZLIB implementors should remain aware of CRIME and BREACH, continued usage seems unproblematic.
Separately, BEAST and Lucky 13 point to requiring TLS 1.1 and, following draft IETF recomendations for secure use of TLS and DTLS, preferring TLS 1.2 with the TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 or other AES-GCM ciphersuite if supported by both endpoints. cryptlib, CyaSSL, GnuTLS, MatrixSSL, NSS, OpenSSL, PolarSSL, SChannel, and JSSE support both TLS 1.1 and TLS 1.2 and all but Java’s supports AES-GCM.
May 17, 2013 Leave a comment
They work fine if clients and hubs support both TTH and its successor adequately long.
While transitioning to a TTH successor, currently interoperable clients and hubs all supporting only TTH will diverge. In examining the consequences of such diversity, one can partition concerns into client-hub communication irrelevant to other clients; hub-mediated communication between two clients; and direct client-client communication. In each case, one can look at scenarios with complete, partial, and no supported hash function overlap. Complete overlap defines the all-TTH status quo and, clearly, works without complication for all forms of DC communication, so this post focuses on the remaining situations. In general,
Almost as straightforwardly, ADC but not NMDC client-hub communication irrelevant to other clients requires partial but not complete hash function overlap but only between each individual client/hub pair, and don’t create specific mixed-hash hub problems; otherwise, an ADC hub indicates STA error code 47. For ADC, This category consists of GPA, PAS, PID/CID negotiation (with length caveats as relate to other clients interpreting the resulting CID), and the establishment of a session hash function; NMDC does not depend on hashing at all for analogous functionality. Thus, for NMDC, no problems occur here. ADC’s greater usage of hashing requires correspondingly more care.
Specifically, GPA and PAS require that SUP had established some shared hash function between the client logging in and the hub, but otherwise have no bearing on mixed-hash-function DC hubs. Deriving the CID from the PID involves the session hash algorithm, which as with GPA/PAS merely requires partial hash function support overlap between each separate client and a hub. Length concerns do exist here, but become relevant only with hub-mediated communication between two clients.
Indeed, clients communicating via a hub comprise the bulk of DC client-hub communication. Of these, INF, SCH, and RES directly involve hashed content or CIDs. SCH ($Search) allows one to search by TTH and would also allow one to search by TTH’s successor. Such searches can only return results from clients which support the hash in question, so as before, partial overlap between clients works adequately. However, to avoid incentivizing clients which support both TTH and its successor to broadcast both searches and double auto-search bandwidth, a combined search method containing both hashes might prove useful. Similarly, RES specifies that clients must provide the session hash of their file, but also “are encouraged to supply additional fields if available”, which might include non-session hash functions they happen to support, such that as with the first client-hub communication category, partial hash function support overlap between any pair of clients suffices, but no overlap does not.
A more subtle and ADC-specific issue issue arises via RES’s U-type message header and INF’s ID field whereby ADC software commonly checks for exactly 39-byte CIDs. While clients need not support whatever specific hash algorithm produced a CID, the ADC specification requires that they support variable-length CIDs. Example of other hash function output lengths which, minimally, should be supported include:
|Bits||Bytes||Bytes (base32)||Supporting Hashes|
|224||28||45||Skein, Keccak, other SHA-3 finalists, SHA-2|
|256||32||52||Skein, Keccak, other SHA-3 finalists, SHA-2|
|384||48||77||Skein, Keccak, other SHA-3 finalists, SHA-2|
|512||64||103||Skein, Keccak, other SHA-3 finalists, SHA-2|
Finally, direct client-client communications introduces CSUP ($Supports), GET/GFI/SND ($Get/$Send) via the TTH/ share root or its successor, and filelists, all of which work if and only if partial hash function support overlap exists. CSUP otherwise fails with error code 54 and some subset of hash roots and hash trees regarding some filelist must be mutually understood, so as with the other cases, partial but not complete hash function support overlap between any given pair of clients is required.
Encouragingly, since together client-hub communication irrelevant to other clients; hub-mediated communication between two clients; and direct client-client communication cover all DC communication, partial hash function support overlap between any given pair of DC clients or servers suffices to ensure that all clients might fully functionally interact with each other. This results in a smooth, usable transition period for both NMDC and ADC so long as clients and hubs only drop TTH support once its successor becomes sufficiently ubiquitous. Further, relative to ADC, poy has observed that “all the hash function changes on NMDC is the file list (already a new, amendable format) and searches (an extension) so a protocol freeze shouldn’t matter there”, which creates an even easier transition than ADC in NMDC.
In service of such an outcome, I suggest two parallel sets of recommendations, one whenever convenient and the other closer to a decision on a TTH replacement. More short-term:
As the choice of TTH’s successor approaches:
By doing so, clients both supporting only TTH and both TTH and new hash function should be capable of interacting without problems, transparently to end-users, while over time creating a critical mass of new hash function-supporting clients such that eventually client and hub software might outright drop Tiger and TTH support.
February 28, 2013 10 Comments
NMDC and ADC rely on the Tiger Tree Hash to identify files. DC requires a cryptographic hash function to avoid the previous morass of pervasive similar, but not identical, files. A bare cryptographic hash primitive such as SHA-1 did not suffice because not only did the files need identification as a whole but in separate parts, allowing reliable resuming and multi-source downloading, and per-segment integrity verification (RevConnect unsuccessfully attempted to reliably use multi-source downloading precisely because it could not rely on cryptographic hashes).
Looking for inspiration from other P2P software, I found that BitTorrent used (and uses) piecewise SHA-1 with per-torrent segment sizes. Since the DC share model asks that same hash function work across entire shares, this does not work. eDonkey2000 and eMule, with per-user shares similar to those of DC, resolved this with fixed, 9MB piecewise MD4, but this segment size scaled poorly, ensured that fixing corruption demanded at least 9MB of retransmission, and used the weak and soon-broken MD4. Gnutella, though, had found an elegant, scalable solution in TTH.
This Tiger Tree hash, which I thus copied from Gnutella, scales to both large and small files while depending on what was at the time a secure-looking Tiger hash function. It smoothly, adaptively sizes a hash tree while retaining interoperability between all such sizes of files files on a hub. By 2003, I had released BCDC++ which used TTH. However, the initial version of hash trees implemented by Gnutella and DC used the same hash primitive for leaf and internal tree nodes. This left it open to collisions, fixed by using different leaf and internal hash primitives. Both Gnutella and DC quickly adopted this fix and DC has followed this second version of THEX to specify TTH for the last decade.
Though it has served DC well, TTH might soon need a replacement. The Tiger hash primitive underlying it by now lists as broken due to a combination of a practical 1-bit pseudocollision attack on all rounds, a similarly feasible full collision on all but 5 of its 24 rounds, and full, albeit theoretical, 24-round pre-images (“Advanced Meet-in-the-Middle Preimage Attacks”, 2010, Guo et al). If one can collide or find preimages of Tiger, one can also trivially collide or find preimages of TTH. We are therefore investigating alternative cryptographic hash primitives to which we might transition as Tiger looks increasingly insecure and collision-prone, focusing on SHA-2 and SHA-3.
October 6, 2012 Leave a comment
DC++ 0.800 fixes a bug wherein multiple magnet links in one message causes a crash. To crash DC++ 0.797 and 0.799, send a main chat message with multiple magnet links. It requires no special operator privileges and can cause general disarray fairly easily.
Since DC++ versions prior to 0.790 are vulnerable to several remote crash exploits themselves (for 0.782), only DC++ 0.790 and DC++ 0.801 remain secure. Other versions, including the ever-popular DC++ 0.674, can be crashed by untrusted, remote users.
May improved security ever prevail.
August 29, 2012 Leave a comment
ADC insufficiently precisely orders the IDENTIFY and NORMAL states such that ADC clients can properly support multiple share profiles. Several client software-independent observations imply this protocol deficiency:
Together, these ADC properties show that a server client which uploads using multiple share profiles must know which CID to send, but must do so before it has enough information to determine via the CTM token the correct share profile and thus the correct CID. Such a putatively multiply-sharing ADC client cannot, therefore, remain consistent with all of the listed constraints.
Most constraints prove impractical or undesirable to change, but by clarifying the SUP specification and IDENTIFY states, one can fix this ADC oversight while remaining compatible with DC++ and ncdc, with jucy apparently requiring adjustment. In particular, I propose to:
This effectively splits the IDENTIFY state into CLIENT-IDENTIFY and SERVER-IDENTIFY to ensure that they send their CINF commands in an order consistent with the requirement that both clients know the CTM token when they send their CINF command, finally allowing ADC to reliably support multiple share profiles.
Such a change appears compatible with both DC++ and ncdc, because both simply respond to CSUP with CINF immediately, regardless of what its partner in a client-client connection does. The only change required in DC++ and ncdc is for the server client to wait for the non-server client to send its CINF before sending a reply CINF rather than replying immediately to the non-server client’s CSUP.
jucy would need adjustment because it currently, by only triggering a non-server client’s CINF, containing the CTM token, in response to the server client’s pre-token CINF. A server client which waits for a jucy-based non-server client to send the first CINF will wait indefinitely.
Thus, by simply requiring that the non-server client in a client-client connection sends its CINF first, in a manner already compatible with DC++-based clients and ncdc and almost compatible with jucy, ADC-based can finally provide reliable multiple share profiles.
September 4, 2011 Leave a comment
Some software packaging systems have a place which requires you to click through or otherwise indicate assent to the terms of the GPL. This is neither required nor forbidden. With or without a click through, the GPL’s rules remain the same.
Merely agreeing to the GPL doesn’t place any obligations on you. You are not required to agree to anything to merely use software which is licensed under the GPL. You only have obligations if you modify or distribute the software. If it really bothers you to click through the GPL, nothing stops you from hacking the GPLed software to bypass this.
The upcoming version of DC++ therefore does not ask the user to assent or otherwise to the GPL during installation.
Interestingly, several other top-ranking GPL-using SourceForge projects, about half of the tested sample, equally uselessly also require Windows users to agree to the GPL before allowing installation:
August 18, 2011 9 Comments
DC++ is licensed under the GPL, which requires that “the source code of the modified version is available to the users”. Courts support the GPL’s binding power in Germany and the US, while companies in additional countries such as the Netherlands (second Dutch case) and Taiwan have found it worthwhile to settle rather than fight. Several DC++ modifications, most prominently GreylinkDC++ and its derivatives, violate the GPL by not releasing source code, and thus lose eligibility for redistribution under the GPL. Absent such explicit GPL-provided allowance, websites and other media distributing them commit copyright infringement.
The DC++ project supports, instead, usage of one of the non-license-violating clients listed at ADCPortal.